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Abstract
In a vertically differentiated industry a domestic and a foreign firm first choose the
quality of their goods and then compete in quantities, or prices, in the home market. We
investigate the cases in which a tariff is chosen before, or after, the firms’ quality decision.
These cases are referred to as the ex-ante and the ex-post game, respectively. Optimal
ex-post tariffs are positive and ensure that the domestic firm always produces the high
quality good. The optimal ex-ante tariff is prohibitive and welfare under domestic monopoly
is lower than under ex-post tariffs, unless firms compete in prices and the domestic firm is
high quality.
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1 . Introduction
In this paper we study the effect of import tariffs in a vertically differentiated
industry where a foreign and a domestic firm sell in the home market. The firms
first simultaneously choose the quality of their goods and then compete in the
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market. The government sets the tariff level before, or after, the firms’ quality
decision. These cases are referred to as the ex-ante and the ex-post game,
1
respectively. We show that in the ex-post tariff game the domestic firm always
produces the high quality good independently of whether competition is in prices,
or quantities. The optimal ex-ante tariff is prohibitive and welfare under domestic
monopoly is lower than under ex-post tariffs, unless firms compete in prices and
the domestic firm is high quality. A tariff has important effects on long run quality
investment and market structure. In response to any tariff a foreign firm always
invests less in quality. The domestic firm, however, lowers (increases) quality
investment if the tariff receiving foreign firm is low (high) quality.
Until recently the strategic trade policy literature has mainly focussed on
imperfectly competitive homogenous, or horizontally differentiated, industries.
The main insights from this literature are that strategic trade policy is sensitive to
the patterns of competition and that optimal policy can vary depending on the mix
of the policy instruments that one considers. The use of these instruments may be
2to a government’s advantage, although sometimes policy instruments are adopted
3,4
even though they may be jointly suboptimal. In all these models the government
decides on the level of the policy instrument before firms decide on their market
strategies. These models thus implicitly assume government commitment to a
specific policy level. Subsequent research on strategic trade policy has investigated
the effect of the timing of moves on the choice of trade policies and domestic
welfare. The principal contribution of this literature is the finding that optimal
trade policy is sensitive to the timing of policy choice and that ex-ante subsidies
5
are generally welfare improving.
There are several reasons why vertical product differentiation models are worth
analyzing. First, there is evidence that intra industry trade characterized by
different levels of quality is a significant proportion of trade (see Greenaway et al.,
1990 among others). Given this it is surprising that little attention has been paid to
1We use Neary’s (1991) terminology.
2Brander and Spencer (1984) show that an activist government can use tariffs as a welfare improving
policy tool in an imperfectly competitive domestic market where a foreign and a domestic firm compete
in quantities. They show that the decrease in consumer surplus is less than the joint increase in
domestic firm’s profits and tariff revenues.
3Brander and Spencer (1985), using a third-market model, show that the noncooperative equilibrium
is characterized by positive production subsidies for both the exporting countries. Joint welfare of the
producing nations would rise if the subsidy levels were reduced by both governments. Eaton and
Grossman (1986) show that under Bertrand competition the optimal policy is a tax on exports.
4Analysing anti-dumping and countervailing duties, Dixit (1988) has shown that the trade policy
equilibrium implies both positive subsidies and tariffs. The domestic government can attain the first
best outcome by using a tariff on imports and a subsidy towards domestic production to eliminate the
oligopoly distortion and to shift rents to the domestic firm. If the government is restricted to using only
tariffs then the (second-best) optimal tariff exceeds its fully optimal value. Also see Collie (1991).
Note, unlike Dixit we do not consider multiple instruments.
5See for instance, Leahy and Neary (1994, 1996, 1999).
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strategic trade policy in vertically differentiated industries. Second, these models
enable us to analyze firm investment in quality, a feature absent from horizontal
product differentiation models. Commitment to quality reflects an important
6
characteristic of oligopolistic markets where firms invest in a long run strategic
variable prior to the market competition stage.
Quality levels being endogenous, two asymmetric pure strategy equilibria arise
7in a duopolistic market whenever consumers have heterogenous tastes in quality.
That is, one high and one low quality firm emerge in equilibrium. Investment in a
long run variable (i.e. quality) and the existence of asymmetric qualities raises
interesting questions for trade policy. Besides affecting investment in quality, trade
policy also affects market structure. It can alter market structure by forcing the exit
of the foreign firm, or result in quality switching (due to which the domestic firm
always produces the high quality good). Quality reversals and exit due to
government policies are unique to the vertical product differentiation models.
In our model, quality switching may occur when the domestic government
chooses its tariff level ex-post. Knowing that the higher its quality level, the higher
the tariff will be ex-post, the foreign firm has little incentive to invest in quality
and is always the low quality producer in the ex-post game. This is due to the fact
that the domestic government moves second, and since investment in quality is
sunk, the government can safely expropriate gross profits of the foreign firm by
setting a high tariff level. Therefore, to guarantee positive net profits, a foreign
firm (producing high quality under free trade), switches positions in the quality
ladder and becomes the low quality producer instead.
The optimal ex-ante tariff is the prohibitive tariff that forces the exit of the
foreign firm. A domestic monopoly is always obtained except for the case in which
8firms compete in prices and the domestic firm is high quality. Ex-post tariffs are
always lower than ex-ante tariffs because the foreign firm, having a first mover
advantage, can induce a lower tariff level by strategically investing less in quality.
9Contrary to what has been shown for output subsidies, domestic welfare under
ex-post tariffs is higher than under both ex-ante tariffs and free trade (except for
the case pointed out above). This is due to the fact that in our model the
government has at its disposal only one instrument to achieve three targets, i.e. to
shift rents towards the domestic firm and to correct for the output and the quality
investment distortions due to the firms’ market power. The government has a
6Trade policy instruments affect short run variables, such as prices and quantities, and also affect
long run variables such as quality. For a discussion of the short- and long-term view of the rent transfer
effect, and the difference between them, see Grossman (1988).
7This is a standard result in the literature on vertical differentiation, see e.g. Motta (1993), Tirole
(1989), Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983, 1984).
8In this case, the optimal ex-ante tariff is positive and allows for low quality imports.
9See, for example, Neary (1991), Leahy and Neary (1994, 1996, 1999).
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second mover advantage in the ex-post game and achieves greater welfare by
10
setting its tariff level after the firms’ quality decisions.
Another important result in our paper is the effect of tariffs on quality
investment by both the foreign and the domestic firm. Independently of whether a
foreign firm produces low, or high, quality, it always invests less in quality in
11
response to any (ex-ante, or ex-post) tariff. The domestic firm invests less (more)
in quality if the tariff receiving foreign firm produces the low (high) quality good.
Tariffs soften competition for the domestic firm and affect long run variables, such
as quality. Subsequently, profits for the domestic (foreign) firm increase (decrease)
under any tariff.
In Section 2, we present the vertical product differentiation model under
quantity competition with the free trade equilibrium quality, quantity, and welfare
outcomes. In Section 3, the ex-post tariff game is analyzed and its outcome is
compared to free trade. In Section 4, the ex-ante tariff game is analyzed and its
outcome is compared to the ex-post game and free trade. In Section 5, we briefly
discuss the results under Bertrand competition. Section 6 concludes. A detailed
treatment of the Bertrand case is included in Appendix A.
2 . The basic model
There are two countries, one foreign and one domestic. Each has a firm that
produces a vertically differentiated good to sell in the domestic market. Firms first
simultaneously select the quality of their goods and then compete in the market by
(simultaneously) setting their quantities. Quality is endogenous and s denotes the1
high quality and s the low quality offered in the market (s $ s ). We concentrate2 1 2
12
on the effects of import tariffs in the domestic market alone. There is a
continuum of consumers in the domestic market, each identified by his taste
]parameter u, which is uniformly distributed over the interval f0,ug with density
]
one; u then represents the size of the market. Each consumer has unitary demand
for the good and a consumer with parameter u has utility:
us 2 p if he buys one unit of the good of quality ss di iU 5 (1)H 0 otherwise
10It is important also to note that in this paper we do not consider tariffs ex-ante contingent on the
quality of imports.
11In a similar model and in response to a quantity restriction, quality downgrading is also shown
(Herguera et al., 2000).
12This is a home market model as in Dixit (1988) and Collie (1991).
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To derive the demand for each type of good, we first define the taste parameter u12
of the consumer who is indifferent between buying the high, or low, quality good,
u 5 p 2 p / s 2 s (assuming p . p ). The consumer indifferent betweenfs d s dg12 1 2 1 2 1 2
buying the low quality good and not buying at all has the taste parameter
¯u 5 p /s . All the consumers for whom u $u $u purchase the good with02 2 2 12
quality s and all consumers for whom u $u $u purchase quality s Those1 12 02 2
described by u ,u do not buy the good at all. Hence the demands for the high02
and low quality good are, respectively:
p 2 p p 2 p p1 2 1 2 2
¯ ]] ]] ]x p , p 5u2 ; x p , p 5 2 (2)s d s d1 1 2 2 1 2s 2 s s 2 s s1 2 1 2 2
with the respective inverse demands:
] ]p x ,x 5us 2 x s 2 x s ; p x ,x 5 u 2 x 2 x s (3)s ds d s d1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2
2s i]Firm i’s cost function is C s ,x 5 cx 1 , where x represents its output and ss di i i i i2
the quality of its good. The marginal cost of production, c, is constant and
independent of quality. Without loss of generality, we assume that marginal cost, c,
is zero for both the domestic and the foreign firm. Quality costs are fixed costs and
there are increasing costs of quality improvement. This specification captures the
distinctive characteristics of (pure) vertical product differentiation models. Shaked
and Sutton (1983) define a purely vertically differentiated industry as one in which
the costs of quality improvement fall primarily into fixed costs and involve only a
modest, or no, increase in unit variable costs. Quality costs borne in the first stage
are treated as sunk in the market competition stage.
2 .1. Free trade equilibrium
We start by briefly presenting the outcome for the benchmark case. Under free
trade, firms first simultaneously select their quality level and then (simultaneously)
choose their quantities. Working backwards, in the last stage, for any given pair of
2s i]qualities (s ,s ), firm i chooses its quantity to maximize its profits, p x ,x x 2 ,s d1 2 i i j i 2
given the quantity of its rival x . From the first order conditions (foc), we get thej
equilibrium quantities:
2s 2 s s] ]1 2 1FT FT]]] ]]]x s ,s 5 u ; x s ,s 5 u (4)s d s d1 1 2 2 1 24s 2 s 4s 2 s1 2 1 2
2FT FT 2 s i]Equilibrium profits are, p s ,s 5 s x 2 , i5 1,2.s ds di 1 2 i i 2
In the first stage, taking the quality of its rival s as given, firm i chooses s toj i
FT s2]maximize p s ,s . Setting l5 , dividing the first order conditions, ands di i j s1
manipulating we get the equilibrium qualities, quantities, profits, and domestic
welfare under free trade (for details see Motta, 1993):
5
  
] ] ]FT 2 FT 2 FT 2]s 5 0.25194u s 5 0.09022u s 5 0.191u1 2
] ] ]FT FT FT 4
x 5 0.4508u x 5 0.2746u CS 5 0.04017u1 2
] ] ]FT 4 FT 4 FT 4p 5 0.01946u p 5 0.00273u TW 5 0.04290u1 2 fh ]FT 4TW 5 0.05964uf l
x s 1 x s] 1 1 2 2]]]Here, s5 , is the average quality in the market and TW (TW ) isfh f lx 1 x1 2
13domestic welfare when the foreign firm produces the high (low) quality good
and the domestic firm the low (high) quality good. Note that under free trade, there
are two asymmetric pure strategy equilibria. In one the domestic firm is the high
14quality producer and in the other it is the low quality producer. The domestic
firm’s profits, as well as domestic welfare, are higher in the equilibrium in which
the domestic firm is the high quality producer.
3 . Tariffs: The ex-post and the ex-ante game
Two alternative assumptions can be made regarding the timing of the policy
decisions. First is the conventional assumption where the government chooses its
level of policy instrument in the first stage of the game. Following Neary (1991)
we refer to this case as the ex-ante game. In this game the government acts as a
Stackelberg leader towards the firms setting the level of its policy instrument.
Taking the government policy as given, the domestic and the foreign firm then act
as Stackelberg followers and first choose their level of quality and then sub-
sequently make their output decisions. Second, the government chooses its policy
level before the market competition stage and after the firms have made their
quality choices. Again, following Neary (1991), we refer to this case as the
ex-post game. Firms now act as Stackelberg leaders in their quality decisions. The
government takes the firms’ quality choices as given when it decides on its policy
level.
A time consistency problem arises in the ex-ante game. Given that the
government announces its policy level before the firms make their quality choices,
the policy may be rendered suboptimal ex-post. Therefore, unless it possesses a
13Domestic welfare is defined as the (unweighted) sum of the domestic firm’s profits and consumer
surplus. The latter consists of the net surplus of consumers purchasing the high, and the low, quality
] 2 ] ] ]2 2 2good and is given by, CS5 s u 2 u 2 x 2 p x 1 s u 2 x 2 u 2 x 2 x 2 p x .f s d g fs d s d g1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2
14There is also a symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies where each firm chooses with some
positive probability the higher quality good and otherwise chooses the lower quality good. In line with
all the existing literature on vertical product differentiation, we abstain from the analysis of mixed
strategy equilibria (see e.g. Tirole, 1989; Motta, 1993; Shaked and Sutton, 1982, 1983, 1984; Sutton,
1991).
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specific commitment mechanism, the government has an incentive to modify its
trade policy after the firms have incurred their sunk costs of quality. Policy
announcements in this scenario can be justified only if the domestic government
can credibly commit to a level of the policy instrument.
The time consistency problem, however, does not arise in the ex-post game. The
firms correctly anticipate the ex-post optimal policy and choose their quality levels
accordingly. Contrary to the ex-ante game, here the firms act as Stackelberg
leaders making their quality choices strategically to influence the government’s
choice of the policy instrument level in the subsequent stage.
In this paper, we consider that the government’s policy instrument is a tariff on
imports. We compare the outcomes of the ex-ante and the ex-post games with the
benchmark free trade case. The solution concept employed to solve for the
multi-stage game is subgame perfect equilibrium.
3 .1. Ex-post tariffs
In this section we analyze the ex-post tariff game and compare its equilibrium
outcome with free trade. As mentioned above, there are two equilibria under free
trade: (i) the foreign firm producing high quality and the domestic firm producing
low quality, and (ii) vice versa.
Interestingly, in the ex-post tariff game, the foreign firm never produces the high
quality good in equilibrium. In the unique equilibrium of this game, the domestic
firm is always high quality. This occurs because a foreign firm (producing high
quality under free trade), anticipating the optimal import tariff in the ex-post game,
will switch positions in the quality ladder and instead produce the low quality
good. The reason is quite simple. The foreign firm switches position in the quality
ladder because it knows that under ex-post tariffs the government has a second
mover advantage. If the foreign firm selects a high level of quality (incurring high
sunk costs), the government, exploiting its second mover advantage, sets a high
tariff thus expropriating the gross profits of the foreign firm. This would then
result in negative net profits for the (high quality) foreign firm.
Below we analyze the two cases in which the foreign firm produces the high or
the low quality good. We show that the foreign firm achieves positive (net) profits
only as a low quality producer.
3 .1.1. High quality foreign firm
¯Let t be the per-unit output tariff imposed on the high quality foreign firm. For
¯t
]analytical convenience, define t5 . Then the profits of the foreign and the
u 2 2] s s1 2] ]domestic firm are p 5 p x ,x x 2 tux 2 and p 5 p x ,x x 2 , respec-s d s d1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 22 2
tively. Solving for the last stage, each firm chooses its output to maximize profits
taking the output of its rival as given. From the first order conditions we obtain the
best response functions:
7
  
] ] ]
us 2 s x 2ut u 2 x1 2 2 1
]]]]] ]]x 5 ; x 5 (5)1 22s 21
It is easy to see from the reaction functions that the tariff increases the marginal
cost of the foreign firm. The tariff shifts the reaction function of the foreign firm
downward resulting in a decrease in the market share of the foreign firm and an
15increase in market share of the domestic firm. From (5) the equilibrium outputs
are:
2s 2 s 2 2t s 1 t] ]1 2 1
]]]] ]]]* *x t,s ,s 5 u ; x t,s ,s 5 u (6)s d s dF G F G1 1 2 2 1 24s 2 s 4s 2 s1 2 1 2
22 s i* * ]Then the equilibrium profits are p t,s ,s 5 s x 2 , i5 1,2.s di 1 2 i i 2
Given the quality choices of the foreign and the domestic firm, the domestic
government selects the ex-post tariff level that maximizes domestic welfare.
Domestic welfare is the sum of consumer surplus, the domestic firm’s profits and
]
*tariff revenues (tux ). From (6) and (3), and manipulating, we get:1
2 2 2
s 1 s s 1 2s t2 3t s]1 1 2 1 22]]]]]] ]TW t,s ,s 5 u 2 (7)F Gs d1 2 2 4s 2 s 2s d1 2
]s1
¯ * ]From the first order condition we obtain the optimal import tariff, t 5 u. The3
optimal ex-post tariff is proportional to the foreign firm’s quality level and
]increases with the size of the market, u. The higher the quality the foreign firm
chooses in the first stage, the higher the import tariff will be and the lower will be,
thus, its market share and profits. In fact, whenever the domestic firm is the low
quality producer, the profits of the foreign firm are always negative independent of
the quality level selected by the domestic firm in the first stage. The foreign firm
thus has no incentive to produce the high quality good. These results are
summarized in the following.
]s1
¯ * ]Proposition 1. A foreign firm, anticipating the ex-post optimal tariff t 5 u,3
never produces the high quality good.
Proof. Let the domestic and the foreign firm select quality in the first stage
]s1
¯ * ]anticipating that the government’s ex-post optimal tariff will be t 5 u. Then,3
from (6), we obtain the firms’ outputs as functions of their qualities:
4s 2 3s 4s] ]1 2 1
]]] ]]]* *x s ,s 5 u ; x s ,s 5 u (8)s d s d1 1 2 2 1 23 4s 2 s 3 4s 2 ss d s d1 2 1 2
22 s i* * ]where their profits are p s ,s 5 s x 2 , i5 1,2. Given the quality level ofs di 1 2 i i 2
15This is the market share effect in Brander and Spencer (1985).
8
  
its rival each firm chooses its quality to maximize profits. The first order
conditions can then be written as:
242 3l s161 3l d 16 41ls d s d] ]2 2]]]]]] ]]]s l 5 u ; s l 5 u (9)s d F G s d F G1 23 39 42l 9 42ls d s d
with l5 s /s . To show that the foreign firm never produces the high quality2 1
good, it is sufficient to show that its profits, p s ,s , are always negative. First, its d1 1 2 ] 2
can be checked that the domestic firm never chooses a quality level s , 0.111u .2
From the first order condition of the domestic firm we observe that the optimal
] 2quality for the domestic firm is always larger than 0.111u (the minimum attained
at l5 0, i.e. s 5 1`). Further, it can be checked that max p (s ,s ), 0 for all1 1 1 2s1] 2
s . 0.0568149u . Therefore, the foreign firm’s profits are always negative2
whenever the (low quality) domestic firm sets its quality level optimally. Thus the
foreign firm never chooses to be the high quality producer under ex-post import
tariffs. Q.E.D
3 .1.2. Low quality foreign firm
The analysis is similar to the case in which the foreign firm is of high quality.
2s1]The domestic and the foreign firms’ profits are p 5 p x ,x x 2 and p 5s d1 1 1 2 1 222] s2]p x ,x x 2 tux 2 , respectively. In the final stage firms simultaneouslys d2 1 2 2 2 2
choose their outputs. From the focs we obtain the best response functions:
] ] ]
us 2 x s us 2 x s 2 tu1 2 2 2 1 2
]]] ]]]]]x 5 ; x 51 22s 2s1 2
Then the equilibrium outputs are:
2s 2 s 1 t s s 2 2ts d] ]1 2 1 2
]]]] ]]]]* *x t,s ,s 5 u ; x t,s ,s 5 u (10)s d s dF G F G1 1 2 2 1 24s 2 s s 4s 2 ss d1 2 2 1 2
22 s i* * ]and the equilibrium profits are p t,s ,s 5 s x 2 , i5 1,2. The governments di 1 2 i i 2
selects a tariff in the second stage to maximize domestic welfare, which from (10)
and (3) can be written as:
2 2 2 23s s 2 s s 1 2s s t2 3s t s]1 2 1 2 1 2 1 12]]]]]]]] ]TW t,s ,s 5 u 2 (11)F Gs d1 2 2s 4s 2 s 2s d2 1 2
From the first order condition we derive the optimal tariff for the government,
]] s2* ]t 5 u. Note that as before the optimal tariff is proportional to the foreigns d3
firm’s quality level and the size of the market. The optimal ex-post tariff creates a
disincentive for the foreign firm to invest in quality in the first stage and thus, as is
shown below, its quality level is lower than under free trade. In the first stage, the
9
  
firms simultaneously select quality level anticipating that the government will
]]*choose an import tariff t 5 s /3u. From (10) we get:2
2 3s 2 s ss d ] ]1 2 1
]]] ]]]* *x s ,s 5 u ; x s ,s 5 u (12)s d s d1 1 2 2 1 23 4s 2 s 3 4s 2 ss d s d1 2 1 2
22 s i* * ]and p s ,s 5 s x 2 . Then the first order conditions can be written as:s di 1 2 i i 2
24(32l)s122 5l1l d (41l)] ]2 2]]]]]]] ]]]s (l)5 u ; s (l)5 u (13)1 3 2 39(42l) 9(42l)
*with l5 s /s . Dividing s (l) with s (l) and solving for l we obtain l 52 1 2 1
160.028584. Then from (13), (12) and (11) we obtain the equilibrium qualities,
quantities, profits, the optimal ex-post tariff and domestic welfare (note that H
denotes the domestic firm and F the foreign firm):
] ] ]H 2 F 2 2]* * *s 5 0.25001u s 5 0.00715u s 5 0.215u1 2
] ] ]H F 2* * *x 5 0.4988u x 5 0.08393u t 5 0.00238u1 2
] ] ]H 4 F 4 4* * *p 5 0.03095u p 5 0.00002u CS 5 0.03143u1 2 ] 4*TW 5 0.06258u
Proposition 2 summarizes the results obtained under ex-post tariffs.
Proposition 2. Under ex-post optimal import tariffs, there is a unique equilibrium
in which the foreign firm is always the low quality producer. Under ex-post tariffs
the qualities offered by both the firms are lower than the equilibrium qualities
under free trade. However, average quality and domestic welfare are always
higher under ex-post tariffs than under free trade.
While the profits of the foreign firm are negative whenever it produces the high
quality good, they are positive if it produces the low quality good. The foreign
firm, knowing that the higher its quality level, the higher the optimal import tariff
will be, strategically selects a lower quality in the first stage in order to induce a
lower tariff level from the government in the subsequent stage. A foreign firm
(producing the high quality good under free trade), anticipating the ex-post optimal
]]*tariff t 5 s /3 u (where s is its own quality), will switch position in the qualitys dF F
ladder and instead produce the low quality good. Contrarily, a low quality foreign
16This is the unique real root of the equation that is smaller than one.
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firm keeps producing the low quality good after the imposition of the ex-post
optimal tariff.
Quality switching is observed as the government chooses its tariff level after the
foreign firm has invested in its quality. Since the foreign firm’s gross profits are
higher when it produces the high quality good, the government can raise more
revenues by imposing a higher tariff on the (high quality) foreign firm. Under the
optimal ex-post tariff both the high and the low quality offered in the market are
lower than under free trade. The foreign firm, faced with the import tariff, offers a
lower quality (relative to free trade) in order to save on costs of quality and thus
obtain positive profits. As product differentiation increases, the domestic firm also
saves on quality costs by offering a lower quality (relative to free trade). Despite
the drop in what each firm offers, the average quality increases as the tariff shifts
the market share from the low quality foreign firm to the high quality domestic
firm. Nevertheless, the reduction in total output due to the imposition of the tariff
outweighs the positive effect of the increase in average quality. As a result
consumer surplus is lower than under free trade.
17Domestic welfare is higher under ex-post tariffs than under free trade. The
reason is that the introduction of an ex-post tariff shifts profits to the domestic firm
and tariff revenues to the domestic government. The welfare increase is substan-
tially stronger when the tariff induces a quality reversal due to a big increase in the
domestic firm’s profits. Our finding is in line with the Grossman (1988) critique
that the long run view of the rent shifting effect may be different than the short run
view given in Brander and Spencer (1985). In fact in our long run scenario where
firms first choose quality and then compete in the market, the rent shifting effect is
reinforced due to the reversal in the equilibrium quality configuration induced by
the ex-post tariff. With the ex-post tariff the domestic firm always produces the
high quality good and hence the rent transfer effect is of a higher order of
magnitude than the classic Brander and Spencer rent shifting effect.
3 .2. Ex-ante tariffs
Consider now the case where the government commits to an import tariff level
before the firms (choosing simultaneously) first select their qualities and then their
outputs. Two possibilities arise in this case. The government can either set a
non-prohibitive tariff that leaves a duopoly in the market, or it could set a
18prohibitive tariff that would result in a domestic monopoly.
Interestingly, the optimal ex-ante tariff is the prohibitive tariff. The resulting
domestic monopolist increases domestic welfare over free trade due to an increase
17Note, and as is seen below, under Bertrand competition domestic welfare increases only if the
foreign firm produces the high quality good under free trade.
18The possibility of governments resorting to prohibitive tariffs was suggested by the Editor,
Jonathan Eaton.
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in its profits. The average quality increases and consumer surplus decreases
relative to free trade. The prohibitive tariff gives greater domestic welfare than any
non-prohibitive ex-ante tariff independent of whether the domestic firm produces
the high, or the low, quality good. In fact, the optimal non-prohibitive tariff is the
one that leaves the foreign firm indifferent between staying in, or exiting, the
market (i.e. it makes zero profits in equilibrium).
Unlike the ex-ante tariff, under an ex-post tariff a government can expropriate
the gross profits of the foreign firm by setting its tariff level after the firms have
incurred their sunk costs of quality. The optimal ex-post tariff is not prohibitive
and leaves room for the foreign firm to sell a small quantity of the low quality
good at positive profits. Hence, output and consumer surplus are higher than under
the ex-ante prohibitive tariff. Further, under ex-post tariffs the government earns
positive tariff revenues from foreign sales that partially compensate for the
decrease in the domestic firm’s profits (that are lower due to foreign competition).
19Consequently, domestic welfare is higher under ex-post tariffs.
This result is in contrast to what has been shown for output subsidies where
government commitment increases welfare. In our model the government has at its
disposal only one instrument to achieve three targets: to shift rents to the domestic
firm and to correct for output and quality investment distortions due to the firms’
market power. The government has a second mover advantage in the ex-post game
and achieves greater welfare by setting the tariff level after the firms have incurred
the sunk costs of quality.
Below, we first analyze the domestic monopoly resulting from an ex-ante
prohibitive tariff. We then show that domestic welfare is higher under a prohibitive
tariff than under any non-prohibitive tariff.
3 .2.1. The prohibitive tariff
Under a prohibitive tariff the domestic monopoly offers a single quality of the
good. The consumer who is indifferent between buying and not buying the good
has the taste parameter u 5 p /s (the subscript M stands for the domesticM M M ]
monopolist case). All the consumers with u ,u ,u purchase the good withM
quality s . The monopolist thus faces the demand curve:M
p] M
]x p ,s 5u 2s dM M sM
2] sM]and its profits are p 5 s u 2 x x 2 . Maximizing with respect to s ands dM M M M M2] ] 2* *x ,we obtain x 5 0.5uand s 5 0.25u . Then the equilibrium outcome under theM M M
ex ante prohibitive tariff is:
19Note, as pointed out by the Editor, a government can make a tariff contingent on the quality
ex-post. In this case, the government can always do ex-ante at least what it can do ex-post. However, in
this paper we look only at government announcement of levels of a tariff.
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] 2*s 5 0.25uM
] ] 4* *x 5 0.5u p 5 0.03125uM M
] ]4 4* *CS 5 0.03125u TW 5 0.0625uM M
The domestic monopolist serves half the market and offers a quality level that is
FT(slightly) lower than the high quality produced under both free trade (s 51] ]2 H 2*0.25194u ) and ex-post tariffs (s 5 0.25001u ). Hence, the total output sold in1 ] FT FT*the market is substantially lower than under free trade (x 5 0.5u , x 1 x 5M 1 2] ] ]H F* * *0.7254u ), or under ex-post tariffs (x 5 0.5u , x 1 x 5 0.58273u ). TheM 1 2
smaller number of consumers served under a prohibitive tariff results in lower
consumer surplus. However, the increase in the domestic firm’s profits due to the
prohibitive tariff more than compensates for the decrease in consumer surplus. As
a result, domestic welfare under a domestic monopolist is greater than under free
trade, independently of whether free trade imports are of high, or low, quality. In
contrast, due to zero tariff revenues, substantially lower output, and only slightly
higher profits for the domestic firm, domestic welfare under the ex-ante prohibitive
tariff is lower than under the optimal ex-post tariff.
3 .2.2. The non-prohibitive optimal tariff
To complete our analysis, we also consider non-prohibitive ex-ante tariffs. We
show that the government imposes the maximum tariff that still leaves a duopoly
in the market. Under the maximum non-prohibitive tariff the foreign firm makes
zero profits. Independent of whether the foreign firm is high, or low, quality,
domestic welfare under this tariff is lower than under the prohibitive tariff. Below
we briefly present the analysis for the ex-ante non-prohibitive tariffs. We consider
20the case where the foreign firm is the high, or low, quality producer.
3 .2.2.1. High quality foreign firm
The last stage is the same as in the ex-post game and the equilibrium outputs are
given by (6). In the second stage, firms choose quality levels simultaneously to
22 s i* * ]maximize profits, p t,s ,s 5 s x 2 , i5 1,2. Defining l5 s /s and m 5 t /s di 1 2 i i 2 12
s , from (6) the focs for the domestic and the foreign firm are, respectively:1
222l2 2m s82 2l1l 1 8m 1 2lmds d ] 2]]]]]]]]]]]s (l,m)5 u (14)F G1 342ls d
20A more detailed treatment of non-prohibitive tariffs is given in Herguera et al. (1997).
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241l 11ms ds d ] 2]]]]]s (l,m)5 u (15)F G2 342ls d
Since Eqs. (14) and (15) cannot be solved analytically for l and m, we proceed as
21follows. Dividing (14) and (15), we obtain an equation involving only l and m.
22Solving for m and choosing the positive root we get m(l). To plot m(l) we need
first to determine the relevant range for the quality ratio l. Note that for t5 0 (free
FT FTtrade), l 5 s /s 5 0.35811. On the other hand, there is a maximum tariff t0 2 1 m
for which the foreign firm still stays in the market, making zero profits. To
determine t and its respective qualities s ,s , we solve the system of focs (14)s dm 1m 2m
and (15) together with the zero-profit condition for the foreign firm. We thus
] 2
obtain the maximum tariff t 5 0.02765u and the respective ratio of qualitiesm
23l 5 s /s 5 0.57538. Hence, the relevant range of l is [0.35811, 0.57538].m 2m 1m
Plotting m(l)in this range, we see that dm /dl. 0. Further, substituting m(l) in
24(14) and (15) we obtain s (l) and s (l). By plotting these expressions, it is seen1 2
that s (l) is increasing and s (l) is decreasing with l. Moreover, by plotting2 1
t(l)5 s (l) ? m(l) we see that dl /dt. 0 for all l in the relevant range.1
Therefore, as the tariff on the imports increases, the foreign firm decreases and
the domestic firm increases its quality level (see Fig. 1). Further, substituting s (l),i
i5 1,2 and t(l) in (6) and plotting in the relevant range, we see that with an
increase in the tariff the profits of the foreign (domestic) firm decrease (increase)
with the level of the tariff. Second, consumer surplus initially decreases and then
increases with the tariff and reaches its maximum under free trade. Third, domestic
welfare increases with the import tariff (Fig. 2). Hence, the welfare maximizing
] 2
˜non-prohibitive tariff is t5 t 5 0.02765u . The equilibrium outcome is:m
] ] ]F 2 H 2 2]˜
˜ ˜s 5 0.24517u s 5 0.14107u s5 0.19506u1 2
] ] ]F H 2
˜˜ ˜x 5 0.35013u x 5 0.32494u t5 0.02765u1 2
1] ]F H 4 4
˜ ˜p 5 0 p 5 0.00494u CS5 0.03852u1 2 1 ] 4TW5 0.05315u
Since domestic welfare under the optimal non-prohibitive ex-ante tariff is lower
1 ] 4*than under the prohibitive tariff (TW , TW 5 0.0625u ), the government willM
21 2 2 3This is an equation which is quadratic in m, i.e (41 17l1 4l ) m 1 (81 2l1 4l ) m 5 15l2
2 3 412l 1 4l 2l 2 4.
22Since s ,s and t are positive, m and l are also positive, the positive root is the relevant root of the1 2
equation.
23This is so, because the ratio of qualities is strictly increasing in the tariff level (see below).
24The analytical expressions of m(l), s (l), t(l) etc. are available from the authors upon request.i
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Fig. 1. Foreign high quality: Quality choice and tariffs.
Fig. 2. Foreign high quality: Total welfare, consumer surplus and profits.
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optimally set a prohibitive tariff in the ex-ante game. The reason is as follows.
Under a non-prohibitive tariff, domestic production is low quality and the
domestic firm’s profits are substantially lower than when the domestic firm is a
monopolist selling the single (high) quality good. The tariff revenues and the
increase in consumer surplus (resulting from the non-prohibitive tariff) do not
compensate for the decrease in the domestic firm’s profit. Thus, domestic welfare
is higher under the prohibitive ex-ante tariff.
3 .2.2.2. Low quality foreign firm
Following similar steps as above, we determine the foreign and domestic firms’
quality in the second stage as functions of the level of tariff imposed on the low
ˆ
ˆquality foreign firm. Defining l5 1/l5 s /s and m5 1/m 5 t /s and using the1 2 2
outcome of the last stage of the game (given by (10)), the focs for the domestic
25
and the foreign firm, respectively, are:
2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆs ds d2l2 11m 8l 2 2l 1 12 4lm2m
ˆ
ˆ ]]]]]]]]]]]s ds l,m 5 (16)1 3
ˆs d4l2 1
2
ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆs dl 12 2m 4l 1 11 8lm2 6ms d
ˆ
ˆ ]]]]]]]]]s ds l,m 5 (17)2 3
ˆs d4l2 1
The above equations together with the zero profit condition for the foreign firm
] 2
ˆdetermine the maximum tariff, t 5 0.01064u and the associated ratio ofm
ˆqualities, l 5 3.513. Hence, the relevant range of ex-ante non-prohibitive tariffsm ] 2
ˆis t[f0,0.01064u g and the associated interval of quality ratios is l [ [2.79243,
3.513].
Figs. 3 and 4 summarize our findings. First, both firms lower their quality level
as the import tariff increases. Second, the foreign (domestic) firm’s profits decrease
(increase) with the level of the tariff. Third, consumer surplus decreases, while
domestic welfare increases, with the tariff level.
˜ ˆThe government thus optimally sets the maximum ex-ante tariff, t5 t 5m] 20.01064u . Then the equilibrium outcome is:
] ] ]H 2 F 2 2]˜
˜ ˜s 5 0.25123u s 5 0.07151u s5 0.19991u1 2
] ] ]H F 2
˜˜ ˜x 5 0.4731u x 5 0.18906u t5 0.01064u1 2
1] ]H 4 F 4
˜ ˜p 5 0.02467u p 5 0 CS5 0.03579u1 2 1 ] 4TW5 0.06247u
25
ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆThe expressions for m(l ), s (l ) and t(l ) etc. are available from the authors upon request. Notei
ˆthat dl /dt. 0 for l in the range 2.79243, 3.513 .f g
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Fig. 3. Foreign low quality: Quality choice and tariffs.
Fig. 4. Foreign low quality: Total welfare, consumer surplus and profits.
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In this case too domestic welfare is lower than under the prohibitive tariff
1 ] 4*(TW ,TW 5 0.0625u ), and hence the government (again) chooses a prohibi-M
tive tariff in the ex-ante game. The reason is as follows. Since the non-prohibitive
tariff allows for low quality imports, the domestic firm’s profits are lower than
under a prohibitive tariff. The increase in consumer surplus (due to higher output)
and the the tariff revenues from the imports, do not compensate for the reduction
in the domestic firm’s profits. As a result, domestic welfare is higher under ex-ante
prohibitive tariffs.
The above results are summarized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 3. The optimal ex-ante tariff is always the prohibitive tariff. The
domestic monopolist sells less than the total output sold under the ex-post optimal
tariff. This results in lower consumer surplus and domestic welfare than under
ex-post tariffs.
4 . Bertrand competition
Our qualitative results do not change under price competition. As in quantity
competition, there is a unique equilibrium under ex-post optimal tariffs, where the
domestic firm always produces the high quality good. Comparing with free trade,
quality reversal is observed under ex-post tariffs whenever imports are of high
quality under free trade.
The underlying reason for quality reversal under Bertrand competition is
somewhat different than under Cournot competition. Anticipating that the higher
the quality level it chooses at the first stage, the higher the tariff on imports will
be, a high quality foreign firm selects a substantially lower quality in order to save
on quality costs. Given that the foreign firm’s quality is not too high, the domestic
firm can increase its profits by selecting a higher quality level than that of its rival,
becoming thus the high quality producer. Similar to quantity competition, under
ex-post optimal tariffs a market structure with a high quality foreign firm and a
low quality domestic firm is not sustainable in equilibrium.
As under Cournot competition, equilibrium qualities under ex-post tariffs are
lower than under free trade. Compared to free trade and ex-ante tariffs, domestic
welfare is higher under ex-post tariffs (except for the case where the domestic firm
is the high quality producer under free trade). The quality reversal substantially
increases the domestic firm’s profits thus increasing domestic welfare. This strong
rent shifting effect dominates the two negative effects (fall in consumer surplus
and tariff revenues) and is the reason behind the higher level of domestic welfare
under the ex-post tariff. Nevertheless, the ex-ante optimal tariff is non-prohibitive
and leads to higher domestic welfare whenever the domestic firm produces the
high quality good. The rent shifting effect is not strong enough in this case and as
a result the reduction in consumer surplus leads to lower domestic welfare under
18
  
ex-post tariffs. This is contrary to what is observed under Cournot competition.
The above results are summarized in the following proposition (see Appendix A
for a proof).
Proposition 4. Under price competition, and ex-post tariffs, there is a unique
equilibrium in which the domestic firm always produces the high quality good. The
]s s 2 s] s df 1 2* ]]]optimal ex-post tariff t 5 u (s is the quality level of the foreign firm)f3s 2 2s1 2
induces a quality reversal whenever the foreign firm produces the high quality
good under free trade. The quality offered by both the firms under ex-post tariffs is
lower than under free trade. When the foreign firm is high (low) quality under free
trade, domestic welfare is higher (lower) under ex-post optimal tariffs than under
both the optimal ex-ante tariff and free trade.
5 . Conclusion
Given that a significant portion of intra industry trade is characterized by
different quality levels, the study of strategic trade policy in such industries is of
major importance. In this paper we present some new results on the effect of
ex-ante and ex-post tariffs in a vertically differentiated home market duopoly. We
show that for most cases ex-post tariffs result in higher welfare than any ex-ante
26tariff. Under ex-post tariffs the domestic firm always produces the high quality
good. Further, our qualitative results are robust to output and price competition.
Our results are important as they highlight the fact that ex-post optimal tariffs
can be a welfare improving policy tool in a vertically differentiated industry. This
is contrary to what has been observed in subsidy games, where ex-ante optimal
subsidies are welfare improving. We obtain this result for two reasons. First, in our
model the government commits to a specific tariff level and not to a tariff schedule
(i.e., tariffs contingent on the quality of imports). Secondly, the government has at
its disposal only one instrument to achieve three targets: shift rents to the domestic
firm, and correct for the output and quality investment distortions due to the firms’
market power. An ex-post tariff is more effective than an ex-ante tariff as the
government chooses its policy level after the firms have borne their quality costs.
Knowing that the higher its quality level in the first stage, the higher the ex-post
tariff will be, the foreign firm invests less in quality and as a result faces a lower
tariff. Due to the lower tariff and quality costs the foreign firm makes positive
profits. Decreased investment in quality on the part of the foreign firm lowers the
competitive pressure on the domestic firm which responds optimally by investing
less in quality.
26Unless firms compete in prices and the domestic firm produces the high quality good.
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In our model, the long term view of the rent shifting effect (Grossman, 1988) is
different than the short term view as given in Brander and Spencer (1985). The
rent transfer effect due to a tariff in our model is often of a higher order of
magnitude as quality configurations change under ex-post tariffs. In the presence
of ex-post optimal tariffs the domestic firm always produces the high quality good
and earns a much higher level of profits. An ex-post optimal tariff effectively
transfers revenues from the foreign firm (high quality under free trade) to the
domestic firm (high quality under ex-post tariffs). As a result, the effect on
domestic welfare is more dramatic than under ex-ante tariffs.
In our model, tariffs affect both investment in quality and market structure in an
important way. Under ex-post tariffs the domestic firm is always the high quality
producer. The ex-post tariff results in quality switching when the domestic firm
offers the low quality good under free trade. In the presence of the ex-post tariff
both the foreign and domestic firms lower their quality investment. Except for the
case in which firms compete in prices and the foreign firm is low quality, the
optimal ex-ante tariff is prohibitive and is thus greater than the optimal ex-post
tariff. The resulting monopolist sells a lower quality and output in the market.
Comparing with ex-post tariffs consumer surplus and tariff revenues are lower
under an ex-ante tariff.
There are a number of limitations in our analysis. First, we focus on import
tariffs only and do not consider domestic output subsidies. In a related paper
(Herguera et al., 1997) we confirm that ex-ante output subsidies are welfare
improving in vertically differentiated industries too. We further show that if a
government can commit to a policy instrument in the first stage, but not to its level
(as in Hwang and Schulman, 1993), it prefers import tariffs over output subsidies.
Second, we do not consider multiple instruments (as in Dixit, 1988 and Collie,
1991). Whether a government can attain the first best outcome with the use of
multiple policy instruments, and if so what set of tools would be necessary to
achieve this target, is a question for further investigation. Third, we do not study
retaliation games between the foreign and domestic government.
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A ppendix A. Proof of Proposition 4
Under free trade, in the last stage firm i chooses its price to maximize profits,
2s i]x p , p p 2 , given the price of its rival p . The equilibrium prices are:s di i j i j2
] ]2s s 2 s u us s 2 ss d s d1 1 2 2 1 2
]]]] ]]]]* *p s ,s 5 ; p s ,s 5 (A.1)s d s d1 1 2 2 1 24s 2 s 4s 2 ss d1 2 1 2
The equilibrium profits then are:
2 22 2* *p s s p ss d s d1 1 1 2 2
]] ] ]]] ]* *p s ,s 5 2 and p s ,s 5 2s d s d1 1 2 2 1 2s 2 s 2 s 2 s s 2s d1 2 1 2 2
In the first stage, given the quality of its rival, s , firm i chooses s to maximizej i
*p s ,s . Defining quality ratio as l5 s /s , dividing the focs, and manipulatings di 1 2 2 1
we get the free trade equilibrium outcome:
FT] ]FT 2 FT 2 FT s2]s 5 0.25331u s 5 0.04824u l 5 5 0.190431 2 FTs1
] ] ]FT 3 FT 3 FT 4p 5 0.10766u p 5 0.01025u CS 5 0.04322u1 2
] ] ]FT 4 FT 4 FT 4p 5 0.02444u p 5 0.00153u TW 5 0.04475u1 2 fh ]FT 4TW 5 0.06766uf l
As under Cournot competition, there are two asymmetric pure strategy
equilibria where one firm produces the high quality good and the other the low
quality good. The domestic firm’s profits and domestic welfare are higher in the
equilibrium where the domestic firm is high quality.
Consider next the ex-post tariff game. Suppose that the foreign firm produces
]
¯high quality. Defining t5 t /u, the profits of the foreign and the domestic firm are
2 2] s s1 2] ]p 5 x p , p p 2 tu 2 and p 5 x p , p p 2 , respectively. In the lasts ds d s d1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 22 2
stage, each firm maximizes its profits given the price of its rival. From the focs, we
obtain the equilibrium prices for the foreign and the domestic firm, respectively:
2s s 2 s 1 t s s 2 s 1 ts d s d] ]1 1 2 2 1 2
]]]]] ]]]]* *p 5 u ; p 5 u (A.2)F G F G1 24s 2 s 4s 2 s1 2 1 2
Then the equilibrium profits are:
] 2 2 22* *p 2 tu s s p ss d s d1 1 1 2 2
]]] ] ]]] ]* *p 5 2 and p 5 21 2s 2 s 2 s 2 s s 2s d1 2 1 2 2
In the second stage, the government selects the tariff that maximizes domestic
welfare, which from (A.2) equals:
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3 2 2 2 2 2 2
s 1 s s 2 2s s 1 2s t2 2s s t2 3s t 1 2s t s]1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 22]]]]]]]]]]]]]] ]TW5 u 2 (A.3)F G2 4s 2 s s 2 s 2s ds d1 2 1 2
From the foc, the optimal ex-post tariff equals:
s s 2 ss d ]1 1 2
¯ ]]]*t 5 u3s 2 2s1 2
Similarly, if the foreign firm is low quality, the profits of the domestic and the
2 2]s s1 2] ]foreign firm are p 5 x p , p p 2 and p 5 x p , p p 2 tu 2 , respec-s ds d s d1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 22 2
tively. In the last stage, firms simultaneously set prices to maximize profits. From
the focs the equilibrium prices are:
2
s 2s 2 2s 1 t s s 1 2s t2 ss d ] ]1 1 2 1 2 1 2
]]]]] ]]]]]* *p 5 u ; p 5 u (A.4)F GF G1 24s 2 s 4s 2 s1 2 1 2
The equilibrium profits then are:
]2 2 22* *p s s p 2 tu ss ds d1 1 1 2 2
]] ] ]]]] ]* *p 5 2 and p 5 21 2s 2 s 2 s 2 s s 2s d1 2 1 2 2
In the second stage, the government selects a tariff to maximize domestic welfare,
which from (A.4) equals:
2 2 2 2 2 2
s 3s s 2 3s s 1 2s s t2 3s t 2 2s t1 2s t ss d ]1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 12]]]]]]]]]]]]]] ]TW5 u 2 (A.5)F G2s 4s 2 s s 2 s 2s ds d2 1 2 1 2
From the foc, the optimal ex-post tariff is:
s s 2 ss d ]2 1 2] ]]]*t 5 u3s 2 2s1 2
We next show that a foreign firm producing high quality cannot be sustained in
equilibrium. Note that, a high quality foreign firm, anticipating an optimal ex-post
tariff which is increasing in its own quality, has no incentive to choose a quality
level that is too high. The domestic firm then has an incentive to jump up in the
quality ladder and become the higher quality producer. Particularly, given:
s s 2 ss d ]1 1 2
¯ ]]]*t 5 u3s 2 2s1 2
the firms’ equilibrium prices are (from (A.2)):
4s 2s 2 s s 2 s 2s s 2 s 2s 2 ss ds d s ds d] ]1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2
]]]]]] ]]]]]]* *p 5 u ; p 5 u (A.6)1 24s 2 s 3s 2 2s 4s 2 s 3s 2 2ss ds d s ds d1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
The equilibrium profits then are:
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] 2 2 22* *p 2 tu s s p ss d s d1 1 1 2 2
]]] ] ]]] ]* *p 5 2 and p 5 21 2s 2 s 2 s 2 s s 2s d1 2 1 2 2
In the first stage, each firm maximizes its profits taking the quality of its rival as
given. Defining l5 s /s , and dividing the focs, we obtain the equilibrium quality1 2
* * *ratio, l 5 s /s 5 2.04551. Then from the focs we obtain the (candidate)1 2 ] ] ]2 2 3* * * *equilibrium outcome: s 5 0.12160u , s 5 0.05945u , p 5 0.05291u , p 51 2 1 2] ] ] ]3 4 4 3
¯* * * *0.01293u , p 5 0.00052u , p 5 0.00374u , t 5 0.03073u , CS 51 2] ]4 4*0.02215u and TW 5 0.03686u . Note, however, that this cannot be an
equilibrium configuration of qualities.
] 2*Suppose that the foreign firm chooses s 5 s 5 0.12160u . Then the domesticl 1
firm has an incentive to switch qualities and produce a higher quality s . s . Inh l
this case the optimal government’s tariff will be:
s s 2 ss dl h l
]]]*t 5 3s 2 2sh l
and the profits of the domestic firm are:
22*p ss dh h
]] ]*p 5 2h s 2 s 2h l
where:
3s 2s 2 s s 2 ss ds d ]h h l h l
]]]]]]*p 5 uh 3s 2 2s 4s 2 ss ds dh l h l
] 2*Plotting p s ,s for s . s 5 0.12160u , it can be easily seen that for sufficientlys dh h l h l ] 4*high s , the domestic firm’s profits are higher than p 5 0.00374u (In fact, theh 2] 4
maximum profits are approximately equal to 0.0213u ).
Further, we check if the foreign firm has an incentive to remain the high quality
*producer by selecting a quality different from s . Clearly, if it chooses a quality1
*s , s , the domestic firm has a strong incentive to become the high quality1 1
producer. On the other hand, the foreign firm has no incentive to choose a quality
*higher than s , since in this case its (net) profits are lower than if it were1
producing the low quality good (see below). It can be checked that, for all these
values of s , the domestic firm has an incentive to switch positions in the quality1
ladder and become the high quality producer.
We next show that the domestic firm producing high quality and the foreign firm
producing low quality is the equilibrium configuration of qualities. Since:
s s 2 ss d2 1 2
]]]*t 5 3s 2 2s1 2
from (A.4) we get the equilibrium prices and profits:
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3s 2s 2 s s 2 s s s 2 s 5s 2 2ss ds d s ds d] ]1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2
]]]]]] ]]]]]]* *p 5 u ; p 5 u (A.7)1 23s 2 2s 4s 2 s 3s 2 2s 4s 2 ss ds d s ds d1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
and
]2 2 22* *p s s p 2 tu ss ds d1 1 1 2 2
]] ] ]]]] ]* *p 5 2 ; p 5 21 2s 2 s 2 s 2 s s 2s d1 2 1 2 2
In the quality selection stage, each firm maximizes its profits taking the quality of
its rival as given. Defining l5 s /s2, from the first order conditions we obtain the1
* * *equilibrium ratio of qualities l 5 s /s 5 38.3633. Then the equilibrium out-1 2
comes are:
] ] ]2 2 3
¯* * *s 5 0.25004u s 5 0.00652u t 5 0.00215u1 2
] ] ]3 3 4* * *p 5 0.12310u p 5 0.00268u CS 5 0.03224u1 2
] ] ]4 4 4* * *p 5 0.03097u p 5 0.00002u TW 5 0.06339u1 2
Finally, it can be checked that no firm has an incentive to switch qualities. As a
result, this is the unique equilibrium outcome under optimal ex-post tariffs.
Comparing with free trade, if the foreign firm is high quality under free trade,
the imposition of the ex-post optimal tariff results in an increase in domestic
] ]FT 4 4*welfare (TW 5 0.04475u ,TW 5 0.06339u ). In contrast, if the foreign firmfh
is low quality under free trade, the ex post tariff decreases domestic welfare (since
]FT 4 *TW 5 0.06766u . TW ). These results are due to two opposing effects. First,f l
under ex-post optimal tariffs both the qualities offered in the domestic market are
] ]2 FT 2* *lower than under free trade, i.e. s 5 0.25004u , s 5 0.25331u and s 51 1 2] ]2 FT 20.00652u , s 5 0.04824u . The lower qualities result in lower consumer2
surplus. Second, there is a positive rent shifting effect due to the imposition of the
tariff. The latter dominates the negative quality downgrading effect whenever the
domestic firm switches position in the quality ladder. If no quality reversal is
observed, the quality downgrading effect is dominant, thus resulting in lower
domestic welfare.
Turning to the ex-ante tariff game, we distinguish between prohibitive and
non-prohibitive tariffs. We know that a prohibitive tariff, which results in a
] 4*domestic monopoly, gives us domestic welfare of (TW 5 ) 0.0625u . ToM
determine the optimal non-prohibitive tariff, we first consider the case where the
foreign firm is high quality. In the second stage, given the government’s tariff on
imports, the domestic and the foreign firm select their quality level to maximize
profits. Defining s /s 5l and m 5 t /s , the focs from (A.1) can be expressed as2 1 1
s (l,m) and s (l,m). Using the focs and the zero profit condition for the foreign1 2
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] ]2 2firm and solving for (s ,s ,t) we obtain s 5 0.2451u , s 5 0.07433u and the1 2 1m 2m] 2
maximum permissible tariff t 5 0.04525u (with the associated quality ratiom ]being l 5 0.30328). Hence, the relevant interval for the import tariff is 0#t#m] 3 FT0.04525u , with the associated interval of quality ratios, l 5 0.19043#l#
0.30328.
Using steps similar to the Cournot case, we can see that s is increasing in t,2
while s is initially (slightly) increasing and then decreasing in t. The profits of the1
˜high-quality foreign firm p decrease with the tariff and reach zero for the1
maximum tariff t , while the profits of the domestic firm p increase with them 2] 4tariff and are equal to 0.00330u for t . Further, consumer surplus decreases withm
the tariff. Finally, domestic welfare increases with the tariff and reaches its
] ]4 2
maximum value 0.05886u at the maximum tariff t 5 0.04525u . However, sincem
the optimal non-prohibitive tariff results in lower domestic welfare than the
prohibitive tariff, the government’s optimal ex-ante tariff is the prohibitive tariff.
] 3
¯ *The latter is much higher than the optimal ex-post tariff t 5 0.00215u . More
interestingly, domestic welfare under the ex-ante optimal tariff is lower than under
] ]4 4* *the ex-post optimal tariff (TW 5 0.0625u , TW 5 0.06339u ).M
Now, consider the case where the foreign firm is low quality. In this case
domestic welfare under free trade is (strictly) higher than under the ex-post
]FT 4 *optimal tariff (TW 5 0.06766u .TW ). The optimal ex-ante tariff results in af l
level of domestic welfare at least as high as under free trade. In this case domestic
welfare is higher under ex-ante tariffs than under ex-post tariffs. In fact, it can be
] 2
˜checked that the optimal ex-ante tariff is t5 0.00565u and the equilibrium
outcome in this case is given by:
] ] ]H 2 F 2 3
˜
¯˜ ˜s 5 0.25231u s 5 0.00455u t5 0.00565u1 2
] ]H 3 F 3
˜ ˜p 5 0.109767u p 5 0.01272u1 2
1] ] ]H 4 F 4 4
˜ ˜p 5 0.000306u p 5 0.02643u TW5 0.068436u1 2
Q.E.D.
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